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Highlights 
 
We utilise a modified Cube Rule to forecast seat shares for the parties in the House of 
Commons in 2015 based on data from 1945 to 2010 
 
The model predicted a hung Parliament with no party having an overall majority of seats, a 
predictive failure. 
 
We show that part of the predictive failure was due to the fact that the poll data did not 
capture the vote intentions of those who actually participated in the election. 
 
We also show that the Coalition government represented a ‘regime shift’ in the time series 
and adjustments for this using an ARIMA model were not sufficient to capture Liberal 
Democrat seat share. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper applies the Seats-Votes Model to the task of forecasting the outcome of the 2015 
election in Britain in terms of the seats won by the three major parties.  The model derives 
originally from the ‘Law of Cubic Proportions’ the first formal statistical election forecasting 
model to be developed in Britain.  It is an aggregate model which utilises the seats won by 
the major parties in the previous general election together with vote intentions six months 
prior to the general election to forecast seats.  The model was reasonably successful in 
forecasting the 2005 and 2010 general elections, but has to be modified to take into account 
the ‘regime shift’ which occurred when the Liberal Democrats went into coalition with the 
Conservatives in 2010.     
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2 
Forecasting the 2015 General Election:  The Seats-Votes Model 
This paper utilises the Seats-Votes model to forecast the outcome of the General Election in 
Britain in May 2015.  This model has been used with some success in the past to forecast 
both the 2005 and 2010 general elections (Whiteley, 2005, 2008; Whiteley et al. 2011; 
Gibson and Lewis-Beck, 2011).  It is derived from the so-called ‘Law of Cubic Proportions’ 
formalised by the statisticians Kendall and Stuart (1950) in an article which represents the 
starting point of contemporary election forecasting modelling in Britain.   
The literature on election forecasting in Britain has grown tremendously in recent 
years and a variety of approaches have been used to predict electoral outcomes (Whiteley, 
1979;  Mughan, 1987; Norpoth, 2004; Sanders, 1991, 2005; Belanger, Lewis-Beck and 
Nadeau, 2005; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Belanger, 2009; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2011; 
Murr, 2011; Fisher et al. 2011; Lebo and Norpoth, 2011). These models utilise different 
methodological approaches and can be classified in a variety of different ways, but two 
important types recur in the literature.  There are popularity functions, which utilise time 
series analyses of monthly or quarterly poll data to capture the relationship between voting 
intentions, the economy and other variables, for the purpose of forecasting.  This approach 
was introduced by Goodhart and Bhansali, (1970) in a seminal paper on economic voting.  
Secondly, there are vote function models which utilise data on election results, an approach 
pioneered by Kendall and Stuart (1950).  These models use aggregate data measured over 
time or alternatively at the constituency level to derive the forecasts (Johnston et al. 2006).   
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages.  Popularity functions are based on 
relatively large numbers of observations, particularly in the contemporary era with the 
presence of many opinion polls, and this increases the precision of model estimates (Duch 
and Stevenson, 2008).  On the other hand this approach faces the problem of translating vote 
forecasts into seats, since winning a general election in Britain does not mean winning most 
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3 
votes, but rather the most seats in the House of Commons.  This is not a trivial distinction 
either since in the twentieth century the party winning most votes did not win most seats on 
three different occasions.  This happened in 1929, 1951 and again in the February 1974, so 
there is a clear advantage in modelling the number of seats at the outset rather than analysing 
voting intentions which subsequently have to be translated into seats.  
The Seats-Votes model uses aggregate analysis combining seat shares from all 
eighteen general elections since the Second World War with poll data to forecast seats in the 
Commons.  It does not face the same problem as popularity function models, but the sample 
size is small making it essential to conduct extensive diagnostic testing to ensure that the 
models are well-behaved.  It also requires the analysis to focus on political parties that have 
been in existence since 1945, and so has little to say about the rise of new parties such as the 
Scottish National Party or UKIP.  These considerations aside, it is a relatively simple model 
with a respectable track record, although as the discussion below shows it has to be modified 
to deal with the era of Coalition politics.  
The Seats-Votes Model 
The seats-votes model adapts ‘Law of Cubic Proportions’ or the ‘Cube Rule’ to forecast seats 
shares over time.  According to the Kendall and Stuart the Cube Rule: 
‘.. states that the proportion of seats won by the victorious party varies as the cube of 
the proportion of votes cast for that party over the country as a whole.’ (Kendall and 
Stuart, 1950: 183). 
Using their example of the ‘White’ and ‘Black’ parties then:  
 
               W          P03 
(1)                 ----  =>  ----- 
                B           Q03 
where: 
W is the ‘White’ party and B is the ‘Black’ party seat shares 
P0 is the White party vote share and Q0 is the Black party vote share, with P0 = 1- Q0, so that:  
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           (2)                                W => B.(P0)3.(Q0)-3 
 
When they applied this model to the task of forecasting seat shares in the 1950 general 
election in Britain using poll data collected three days before the election the results were 
extremely accurate.  The forecasting errors were one seat for Labour, five seats for the 
Conservatives and four seats for other parties, with the Liberal forecast being spot on 
(Kendall and Stuart ,1950: 194).   
The key weakness of the model, fully acknowledged by the authors, was that it really 
only works in a dominant two party system in which it is safe to ignore minor parties.  This 
was certainly true in 1950 when the Conservatives and Labour together took 90 per cent of 
the vote and 98 per cent of the seats.  But as the British party system evolved towards the 
multi-party system of today the forecasts got progressively less accurate.  In the early 1970s 
Edward Tufte (1973) suggested that a ‘2.5 rule’ should be used as an alternative and Laakso 
(1979) showed that this appeared to work quite well at that time.  But as we enter a new 
context of a fragmented multi-party system this is no longer the case.  
Accordingly, we make three modifications to the Cube Rule to adapt it for forecasting 
seats in the 2015 election.  The first change is to estimate the exponents rather than assuming 
that they are 3.0, thereby removing one source of error.  Secondly, we utilise seat shares won 
by each party in the last parliament rather than the seat shares won contemporaneously by the 
rival party, as in equation (2).  This is designed to capture the incumbency effect, which is 
partly a matter of existing MPs having a personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987), 
but also the fact that parties represented at Westminster generally have much better coverage 
in the media than their non-parliamentary rivals and therefore are much better known to the 
general public.  Incumbency bestows several advantages on the existing parties which need to 
be taken into account in the modelling.  
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5 
The third change is that we utilise poll shares six months rather than three days prior 
to the election in order to make the forecast.  The six month lag has been identified as the 
most efficient compromise between having the longest lead time for the forecast with the 
highest goodness of fit of the model (Whiteley et al. 2011).   It is clearly advantageous to 
have as long a lead time for the forecast as possible without this degrading its accuracy and 
the six months lag achieves this goal. 
The theoretical forecasting model is given by the following expression: 
     
                               k 
Sit   =   α(Sit-1)γi . П (Pit-m)βi. εi 
                                    i=1 
where 
Sit  is the seat share of party i at the election at time t 
Pit-m  is the vote share for party i out of  k parties, in the polls m months prior to  the election                           
α, β
j
, γ
i
 are parameters to be estimated 
εi  is an error term where E(εi)=0, var(εi) = σ2 
The theoretical model includes all rival parties but in practice this cannot be estimated since it 
would be perfectly collinear, so the empirical model estimates future seats for a party from its 
past seats and also from poll data for the party and its main rival.   
For example, the Labour seat model in log-linear form is: 
          ln(LabSt)  =  ln α   +   β1ln(LabSt-1) +  β2ln(LabPt-m)  +  β3ln(ConPt-m)  +  ln.ε 
where: 
LabSt is the number of Labour seats won at election t 
LabPt-m is the Labour vote share in the polls m months prior to the election 
ConPt-m is the Conservative vote share in the polls m months prior to the election 
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6 
The Conservative seat share model has the same specification as the Labour model but 
with lagged Conservative seat shares as a predictor.  In previous versions the Liberal 
Democrat model utilised lagged Liberal Democrat seat share along with Liberal Democrat 
and Conservative vote shares in the polls (Whiteley et al. 2011).  However, soon after the 
Liberal Democrats entered the Coalition government in 2010 a major change occurred to 
their support.   
(Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 1 shows vote intentions for the Liberal Democrats using monthly data from the 
Continuous Monitoring Survey from the date of the general election of 2010 election up to 
February 20151.  After the party obtained 23 per cent of the vote in the 2010 general election, 
Liberal Democrat voting intentions dropped dramatically in the months immediately after the 
election and have stayed at a low level since (Clarke et al. 2011; Whiteley et al. 2013).  This 
change cannot be captured by the Seats-Votes model, since there are no seat data available 
after 2010.  This sea-change in Liberal Democrat support is what econometricians call a 
‘regime switch’ or a fundamental shift in the behaviour of a time series caused by an outside 
shock to the system, and this needs to be taken into account in the modelling (Carnot, Koen 
and Tissot, 2005).   We return to this issue below.   
The empirical models for the two major parties contain a dummy variable designed to 
capture the split in the Labour party in 1981 when the Social Democratic Party was formed.  
This huge shock to the party system arose from Labour’s defeat in 1979 and had a very 
strong impact on the party’s poor performance in the subsequent 1983 election.  So the 
                                                          
1
 The Continuous Monitoring Survey of the BES ended in December 2012, and so the series 
is continued up to February 2015 using the same voting intention question in the Essex 
Continuous Monitoring Survey.   
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7 
variable scores one in 1979 and 1983 and zero otherwise, to capture these divisions in the 
party which occurred after it lost power to Mrs Thatcher in 1979.  
(Table 1 about here) 
The results of the modelling for the two major parties appear in Table 1 where all 
variables apart from the split dummy are expressed in logarithms.  It can be seen that the 
effects are highly significant for both the Labour and Conservatives.  The coefficient of the 
seats lagged variable which measures the inertia in the system is similar for both parties, and 
as expected Labour voting intentions six months prior to the election have a strong positive 
impact on Labour seat shares and Conservative vote intentions have a significant negative 
effect.  The reverse is true for the Conservative seats model with Conservative vote intentions 
boosting and Labour vote intentions reducing Conservative seat shares.  Finally, the Labour 
split variable has significant negative impact on Labour seats and weakly significant positive 
impact on Conservative seat shares.  
 Various diagnostic tests (Table 1) show that the models are free of residual 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the estimates and the model residuals approximate a 
Normal distribution, indicating that there are no significant outliers that influence the results 
(Kennedy, 2013).  The Ramsey test for the adequacy of a linear functional form test is not 
significant for Labour although it is significant for the Conservatives2.  Overall, these 
diagnostic tests indicate that the models are quite well behaved and so are likely to produce 
reliable results when applied to the task of forecasting seats in May 2015. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Note that if the Conservative model is estimated in linear rather than logarithmic form the 
Ramsey test is non-significant.  This implies that the positive effect for the Conservatives is 
not a serious problem that will unduly distort the results.   
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8 
The Liberal Democrat Model 
 Given the recent regime switch for the Liberal Democrats we use an alternative 
approach to estimating the forecast for that party.  We estimate the Liberal Democrat vote 
share in the 2015 election before translating this into seat shares utilising the long-term 
relationship between seats and votes for the party found in all the elections since the Second 
World War.  This exercise involves estimating a popularity function and since we are not 
concerned with modelling the effects of the economy or other variables on the Liberal 
Democrat vote, the simplest and most parsimonious type of popularity function is a univariate 
Autoregressive-Moving Average model (ARIMA).  This class of model was introduced by 
Box and Jenkins (1970) and it has been used to forecast vote shares in British general 
elections in the past (Whiteley, 1979).  It is designed to extract the maximum amount of 
information from the data in order to forecast it efficiently while controlling for the random 
noise in the series. 
 The starting point of the Box-Jenkins modelling strategy is to determine if the series is 
stationary, that is, if it fluctuates around a constant mean and has a finite variance in the limit.  
Figure 1 appears to suggest that Liberal Democrat voting intentions is non-stationary since it 
declines throughout the period from 2010 to 2015.  But a Phillips and Perron (1988) test for a 
unit root demonstrates that the series is in fact stationary3,  which can be attributed to the fact 
that Liberal Democrat vote intentions collapsed very rapidly in late 2010 and the series has 
changed very little since then.  This means that the Liberal Democrat ARIMA model is one 
where the 'I' term is 0, indicating that the Liberal Democrat voting intentions do not need to 
be differenced to obtain mean stationarity before estimating AR or MA terms.   
(Table 2 about here) 
                                                          
3
 The critical value for Z(t) in the Phillips-Perron test of the Liberal Democrat vote intentions 
series is -4.48 which is significant at the 0.01 level.  Since the null hypothesis is that the 
series is nonstationary, rejecting the null implies that the series is stationary.  
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9 
Table 2 shows two versions of the ARIMA model, the first is a purely autoregressive 
model and the second an autoregressive-moving average model.  The autoregressive 
coefficients are highly significant in both versions, and the moving average coefficient is 
significant in the second. The Ljung-Box portmanteau test indicates if there is any systematic 
information left in the residuals which has not been captured by the model (Ljung and Box, 
1978).  These tests are non-significant for both models indicating that the model residuals are 
white noise and therefore do not contain any useful additional information.  The Akaike and 
Bayesian Information Criteria test if the second model is an improvement on the first in terms 
of the goodness-of-fit (see Burnham and Anderson, 2002).  These coefficients confirm that 
the second model is indeed and improvement on the first, and so we utilise the 
autoregressive-moving average model in order to forecast the Liberal Democrat (LD) vote 
share in the 2015 election. 
The ARIMA model predicts that the Liberal Democrats will receive 8.4 per cent of the 
vote in the election and this can be used to forecast the party’s seat share.  If we use the 
historic relationship between seat shares and vote shares for the party which has operated 
since 1945 then it is predicted to win 11 seats in 2015.  But, as the earlier discussion 
indicates, this ignores the impact of seats won in the 2010 general election.  If the latter are 
incorporated into the forecasting equation then the party is predicted to win 34 seats in 20154.  
Figure 2 summarizes the forecasts for all parties in the general election.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
                                                          
4
 The estimates are: 
 
LDSt  =  -0.20   + 0.68LDSt-1  + 0.46LDFt    Adjusted R2 = 0.84, Durbin’s H= 0.99 
                (0.5)      (4.8)                (3.0)  
 
where: LDS = logged Liberal Democrat Seats,  LDF = logged Liberal Democrat Vote 
Forecast (t statistics in parenthesis) 
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Conclusion:  Deadlock 2015 
The Seats-Votes model is a relatively parsimonious aggregate level forecasting tool which 
derives from the Cube Rule which successfully forecast seat shares in the era of two-party 
politics in the 1950s and 1960s.  We have adapted it to the task of forecasting seat shares in 
an election which looks very different from those which occurred sixty years ago.  The model 
had a reasonably good track record in forecasting seats in the 2005 and 2010 general 
elections. But it requires additional modification to deal with the advent of coalition politics 
in Britain in 2010.  The 2010 general election produced a hung parliament and the model 
suggests that the parliament that elected in 2015 will be even more divided, making it very 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to form a stable coalition government.  It would not be 
surprising if another general election occurred well before 2020 in these circumstances.  
Post-Election Postscript: Learning from Experience 
As is well known all the forecasting models got it wrong with the exception of the exit poll 
conducted on the day of the election.  In the case of the Seats-Votes model two factors help to 
explain the failure of the modelling.  One was the effect of the regime shift on the Liberal 
Democrat seat share, and the second was the inaccuracy of the polls six months out which 
were used to predict the seats won by Labour and the Conservatives.   
Regarding the first factor, in our paper we argued that the Liberal Democrats had 
experienced a ‘regime shift’ and therefore modelling their support required a different 
approach than that used for the Conservatives and Labour.  With hindsight it appears that the 
regime shift was more fundamental than we thought.  The paper showed that if Liberal 
Democrat seats in 2010 had no effect at all on seats in 2015, implying no incumbency effect, 
then the forecast would give the party 11 seats.  In fact it won 8 seats, so on this assumption 
the forecast was 3 seats out.  The Lib Dem regime shift was clearly more profound than we 
originally envisaged.  
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The second factor concerns the fact that the voting intentions data gathered six 
months prior to the election were inaccurate guides to the vote shares the Conservatives and 
Labour actually obtained.  This discrepancy negatively affected the seats forecasts for these 
two parties.  The point can be demonstrated by recomputing our forecast, using actual vote 
shares obtained in the 2015 election, rather than vote shares in the polls six months out.   In 
the event, the Conservatives obtained 36.9 per cent of the vote share and Labour 30.4 per cent 
in the election.  When these numbers are used in our forecasting model it predicts that the 
Conservatives would win 333 seats and Labour 245 seats.  Since the Conservatives seat total 
was 331 and Labour 232 seats, the forecasting errors under this assumption are quite modest.  
This raises the possibility that the vote intentions data could have been adjusted to make them 
more accurate.   
We believe that there are two such adjustments.  First, given a turnout of 66 per cent 
in 2015, it is evident that employing a 'likely voter' filter to polling data may be very 
important for improving the accuracy of parties' vote share estimates.  Second, recognizing 
the possibility of campaign effects suggests that, in general, surveys conducted several 
months before an election risk being less reliable guides than surveys carried out closer to the 
contest.  
These ideas can be illustrated by employing a 'likely voter' filter to data gathered in 
the April 2015 Essex Continuous Monitoring Survey (ECMS).  For respondents eligible to 
vote in the 2010 or earlier general elections, the filter uses two criteria: (a) a score of 10 on a 
0-10 'likely to vote' scale and (b) reporting voting in 2010.  For young people first eligible to 
vote in 2015, (b) is replaced by agreement with a statement regarding voting as a civic duty—
a strong predictor of turnout (see, e.g., Clarke et al. 2004).  Figure 3 displays the resulting 
survey vote shares, together with the parties' actual vote percentages in Great Britain. 
(Northern Ireland was not included in the survey).  As the figure shows, discrepancies 
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between the two sets of figures tend to be quite small—1.1 per cent on average.  Taking 
sampling error into account, the only statistically significant difference (p < .05) involves the 
Conservatives where the miss is 2.6 per cent, just outside the boundaries of a 95 per cent 
confidence interval. 
A final point—when using polling data as input to an election forecasting model, it is 
important to recognize and respect the reality of sampling error.  Sampling error is not merely 
a 'get out of jail free' card for embarrassed pollsters whose data miss the mark.  Rather, it is 
an intrinsic feature of the survey research enterprise.  Acting in conjunction with the 
sensitivity of a first-past-the-post system to changes in vote shares in situations where there is 
a sizable number of marginal seats, sampling error entails a continuing possibility of getting 
an election outcome wrong.  With more and better survey data and improved models, we can 
reduce the probability of incorrect forecasts, but we cannot eliminate it entirely.  That said, 
being right on most occasions is a worthy goal. 
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Figure 1. Trend in Liberal Democrat Voting Intentions, 
 June 2010 to February 2015 
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Figure 2. Forecasts for the 2015 General Election from the Seats-Votes Model 
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Figure 3.  ECMS April 2015 Pre-Election Survey Vote Intention Shares 
Among Likely Voters and 2010 Election Result in Great Britain 
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Table 1.  Labour and Conservative Seats-Votes Forecasting Models  
 
Predictors Labour Seats Conservative Seats 
 
 
Number of Seats Lagged one Election 
 
0.54*** 
 
0.59*** 
 
Labour Poll Share six months out 
 
0.46*** 
 
-0.47*** 
 
Conservative Poll Share six months out 
 
-0.37*** 
 
0.72*** 
 
Labour Split Dummy Variable 
 
-0.19*** 
 
0.14* 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.86 
 
0.86 
 
Serial Correlation Chi-Square Test 
 
1.1 
 
0.84 
 
Ramsey Functional Form Test 
 
0.48 
 
4.95** 
 
Residual Normality Test 
 
0.70 
 
0.91 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
0.00 
 
0.11 
   
 
N = 18 
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Table 2.  ARIMA Models of Liberal Democrat Vote Intentions, 
June 2010 to February 2015  
 
 AR(1) Model AR(1) MA(1) Model 
 
 
Constant 
 
11.12*** 
 
12.04*** 
 
Autoregressive Parameter 
 
0.88*** 
 
0.97*** 
 
Moving Average Parameter 
 
--- 
 
-0.33** 
 
Ljung-Box Q 
 
33.26 
 
20.86 
 
  
Model Selection Statistics: 
  
 
AIC 
 
219.24 
 
214.02 
 
BIC 
 
225.37 
 
222.19 
   
 
*** - p < .001; ** - p < .01 
 N = 56 
Note: --- - parameter not included in model.  
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